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HE avalanche of professional and lay literature continued mostly
in support of recognition of same-sex unions as marital ones.1 The
United States Congress responded negatively in 2003 by enacting
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 2 and the Act has begun to pro-
duce some reported responses from the courts. In In re Kandu,3 for ex-
ample, a bankruptcy court in a sister community property state examined
a joint filing for bankruptcy by a same-sex couple joined by a civil union
in Canada. The court concluded that in the context of a joint petition for
bankruptcy, DOMA really does nothing more than define a spouse as a
member of the heterosexual union and thus did not allow a joint filing of
a same-sex couple in bankruptcy. Nor was the principle of comity of any
assistance to the petitioners. In effect the court treated DOMA as
purely federal in this context and thus not requiring any reference to state
law. All told the trial court's conclusion that the woman's claims were
"frivolous and groundless" was certainly near the mark, if not altogether
on target.
2. Parental Contract
In re Sullivan4 involved what may be somewhat inelegantly termed a
fertilization contract by which an unmarried woman entered into an
agreement with an unmarried man to provide sperm for her artificial in-
semination. The parties agreed by what they called a "coparenting
agreement" that the woman's conception was their joint decision and
each agreed that the child conceived would belong to both of them as
though they were married at the time of conception, that the man would
be named as father on its birth certificate, and that they would share cus-
tody of the child. Before the child's birth, however, disagreement arose
* B.A., University of Texas, M.A., B.C.L., Oxford University, L.L.M., Columbia.
The author thanks Clinton C. Brown for his assistance in preparing this essay.
1. See Jill Schachner Chanen, The Changing Face of Gay Legal Issues, 90 A.B.A. J.
47 (July 2004); EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
2. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
3. 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
4. 157 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
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between the prospective parents and soon after the child's birth the man
petitioned the district court to adjudicate his rights to the child. In af-
firming the trial court's refusal to deny a writ of mandamus in response to
the woman's plea to the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the
man's petition, the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals denied the writ
and held that in absence of any statutory authority5 or allegation of fraud
in seeking the court's jurisdiction6 to the contrary, the man had standing
to seek adjudication of his rights under the contract. The court went on
to say that the man's status as a sperm-donor would be determined at the
litigation stage of the proceeding rather than at the threshold of this suit
concerning paternity. Thus the question of applicability of section
160.602 of the Family Code7 with respect to the fact of the man's being
the sperm-donor 8 was postponed.
B. MARRIAGE
1. Incremental Legal Change
Without very much notice by the lay public or the legal profession, the
legal significance of the institution of marriage and its significance in law
have undergone very gradual but remarkable dilution in the United
States over the last century. 9 Ironically the much publicized attempt to
extend the institution to couples of the same sex and thus to make it more
pervasive by expanding its adherents also provides some notable changes,
if minor, adjustment in Texas law. Over the last three decades, in addi-
tion to the occasional significance of disputes between unmarried cohabi-
tants, the marital state was explicitly and accurately defined as a
heterosexual institution in 197510 and liability for criminal conversation,11
which by judicial interpretation includes rape, was abolished.12 The avail-
ability of marriage was nevertheless expanded by the repeal of antiquated
statutes prohibiting entry into miscegenous marriage in the late sixties
and the memory of such strictures has faded away. Though the action for
breach of promise of marriage is still intact, section 1.10813 requires a
writing for an enforceable promise or agreement made on consideration
of marriage or "non-marital conjugal cohabitation."
5. Id. at 921 (majority op.), 922 (Hedges, C.J. concurring).
6. Id. at 914.
7. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.602 (Vernon 1998).
8. Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d at 920.
9. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The Incredible Retreat of
Law from the Relation of Marriage, 63 LA. L. REv. 243 (2003).
10. See Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary on the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 281 (1974) (Commentary to section 1.01, replaced by TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 2.001 (Vernon 1998) in terms of those to whom a marriage license may be issued).
Id. Section 2.401, enacted in 1997, also provides that informal marriage may be entered
into only by a heterosexual couple.
11. Now TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.106 (Vernon 2005).
12. Id. §§ 1.106, 1.107 (Vernon 2005).
13. Id. § 1.108 (Vernon 1998).
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Despite all the discussion over the recognition of the institution of
same-sex unions, there has been little discussion of the legal conse-
quences of dealing with breakdown of such unions, except insofar as the
consequences may be covered by contract, partnership, agency, or trust
law. 14 A series of statutory provisions have been enacted without any
ultimate change of law to allow means of automatic termination of an
unrecorded informal marriage. The final version of that series of acts is
section 2.401 of the Family Code, which allows dissolution of any such
nascent informal union two years after the couple's separation without
any action taken to assert existence of the union. 15
2. Informal Marriage
The dispute in Nichols v. Lightle16 arose out of a conveyance of the
grantor's one-half interest in purported community interest in land ac-
quired by the grantor's alleged wife during an alleged informal marriage.
After a judgment creditor of the grantee levied execution on the
grantee's interest, the grantor's alleged wife brought suit to clear the
cloud from her title. The land was acquired by the petitioner after her
divorce from the grantor. The woman testified that she had not remar-
ried the man but that she sometimes provided him with food and allowed
him to stay in her home from time to time. Though the man asserted that
an informal marriage had arisen between him and his former wife, the
trial court concluded that there was insufficient evidence of the elements
that constitute an informal marriage. The Amarillo Court of Appeals af-
firmed that conclusion.' 7
In Ball v. Smith18 a woman sued her estranged male companion to es-
tablish an informal marriage and a partition of assets accumulated during
their time together. The trial court granted the man's summary judgment
motion and the woman appealed. After a brief courtship the couple had
become engaged to marry, but after awhile they decided against a formal
union but continued to live in the man's residence on which the woman
asserted that she had made costly expenditures. Proof of these payments,
however, was not forthcoming, and the court also rejected her claims that
the couple had established an informal marriage or to meet the defini-
tion of a partnership. The trial court awarded the man his attorney's fees.
In her appeal, the woman did not press the issue of informal marriage.
14. See, e.g., Zaremba v. Cliburn, 949 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no
writ); Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1982, no writ).
15. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (Vernon 1998). This course of legislation got un-
derway in response to a proposal to abolish the institution of informal marriage. The
enactment of three successive acts (1989, 1995, and 1997) has brought the law back to the
point of departure. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 44 Sw. L. J.
1 (1990); Joseph W. McKnight , Family Law: Husband and Wife, 49 SMU L. REV. 1015,
1016-17 (1996).
16. 153 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, pet. denied).
17. Id. at 571.
18. 150 S.W.3d 889 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
2005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Her partnership argument was rejected 19 along with her claims for
money had and received (which she termed "reimbursement and parti-
tion").20 An apparent argument as to a resulting trust was not raised in
her pleading. 21 The appellate court also rejected the woman's argument
that the amount of attorney's fees amounted to a sanction.22
3. Marriage Licencing
In an opinion concerning the marriage licensing process, the Attorney
General addressed a county clerk's question whether a license to marry
may be granted when both applicants do not appear before the county
clerk. 23 As enacted in 1997, the Family Code in section 2.002 provides
that in applying for a marriage license "[e]xcept as provided by Section
2.006, each person applying.., must appear before the county clerk."24
Section 2.00625 then provides that
(a) If an applicant is unable to appear personally before the county
clerk to apply for a marriage license, any adult person or the
other applicant may apply on behalf of the absent applicant.
(b) The person applying on behalf of an absent applicant shall pro-
vide to the clerk:
(1) the affidavits of the absent applicant ... [supplying certain
enumerated facts]
The quandary presented to the county clerk was whether both applicants,
who were then imprisoned, could appear by proxy before the clerk. The
county clerk manual of 1998 states categorically that they cannot.26 The
Attorney General's opinion pointed out, however, that those instructions
seem to have been based on the statute of 1973,27 which made it clear
that the licensing process was available only when one applicant could
appear and "any adult person or the other applicant" could appear for
the one absent. The language of the section 2.006 enacted in 1997 dif-
fered from that of the similar statute of 1973. But the bill analysis of 1997
as presented to the Senate Committee on Jurisprudence stated that the
"bill makes no substantive changes and recodifies Title 1 of the Texas
Family Code" as required of any bill offered as a non-substantive statu-
tory revision under the ongoing process of the statutory revision plan of
1963.28 A non-substantive revision under the 1963 act allows for modern-
ized language of an existing body of law and as such it is not subject to
19. Id. at 895.
20. Id. at 895-96.
21. Id. at 896.
22. Id.
23. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. GA-0024 (Feb. 19, 2003).
24. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.002 (Vernon 1998).
25. Id. § 2.006.
26. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., COURT CLERK PROCEDURE MANUAL § (c)(4) VIII-6
(1998).
27. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.02, 1.05 (1973).
28. See Code Construction Act, TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 323.007(b) (Vernon 2005).
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amendment in the process of enactment. The 1973 act stated in section
1.05 that, "If only one of the applicants is able to appear personally
before the county clerk to apply for a marriage license, any adult person
or the other applicant may apply on behalf of the absent applicant."
The Attorney General's opinion states that this 1997 language allows
that if "two absent applicants [may] apply for a marriage license pro-
vided they each have an adult person to apply for the license on their [sic]
behalf." The writer of the opinion not only disregarded the previous stat-
ute which the 1997 statute was meant to replicate but also concluded that
the language of section 2.006(a) that if "an applicant is unable to appear
personally... any adult person or the other applicant may apply on be-
half of the absent applicant." That language is as plain as that of 1973 but
in ordinary usage "an applicant" means only one applicant not both appli-
cants. In effect, the opinion acknowledges that the 1997 statute changed
the effect of the provision of 1973. As authority for the opinion's conclu-
sion that a new rule applies, the Attorney General cited the decision of
the Texas Supreme Court in Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander29
that plain language of a nonsubstantive legislative revision of prior law
need not honestly reflect what went before if the plain language of the
new act provides a contrary rule. The Attorney General's opinion then
went on to say that the language of section 2.006 of 1997 plainly "allows
absent applicants to apply for a marriage license," provided that they
each have a person apply for the license "and that each submit the infor-
mation requested by statute." But contrary to the Attorney General's
conclusion, section 2.006 is ambiguous and should be interpreted as the
Code Construction Act directs.30 When the statute was amended in 1973
a special exemption was allowed for only one applicant when out of state
or for some other similar reason unable to appear in person. The excep-
tion in favor of only one applicant was made after careful consideration.
It was thought by the draftsmen that allowing a license to be acquired by
both absent applicants is an invitation to fraud by same-sex applicants. In
light of these circumstances it is suggested that a special exception should
be provided for prisoners of different sexes and such persons absent on
public service.
This instance, and like cases, seem to reach the conclusion that continu-
ing the plan of code revision under the 1963 act constitutes, at best, a
misleading subterfuge. In light of the intervention of ten legislators as
amici curiae in Fleming Foods and the court's evident concern for the
administration of the state's sales tax system which it involved, it must be
agreed that as a matter of law the recodification plan of 1963 has been
put aside by the Texas Supreme Court. Thus some other scheme for stat-
utory revision should be provided. A series of bills to deal with this and
other past inadvertent changes in non-substantive revisions is very much
29. 6 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 1999).





Those who have missed the post-divorce litigation of the Sutherlands32
will be pleased to see that the Waites are back.33 The Waites were mar-
ried in 1968 and had four children. In 1991, both sued the husband's em-
ployer for defamation and the dispute was settled for over $3,000,000.
After many arguments over the ownership of the settlement proceeds
and some physical injury of the wife by the husband, the couple separated
in 2000, and the wife brought suit for divorce in Texas on the ground of
insupportability. As the Texas divorce case proceeded, the husband
brought suit in Alabama in late 2001 against his alleged wife to attack the
validity of the wife's 1960 divorce from her former husband. The plaintiff
asserted the Alabama divorce-court's lack of jurisdiction as a conse-
quence of the parties' failure to meet durational residence requirements.
In that case, judgment was rendered in favor of the wife and affirmed by
the Alabama Supreme Court. 34 The husband then filed a second suit for
a declaratory judgment in 2003 with both parties to the prior divorce as
defendants. The trial judge rendered judgment sua sponte for the defend-
ants. The husband's appeal to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals was
granted because the manner of the court's dismissal was improper.35
Meanwhile, in Texas, the husband brought two unsuccessful appeals in
the Texas proceeding concerning the appointment of a receiver and five
mandamus petitions. 36 The trial court finally awarded about two-thirds
of the couple's community assets to the wife and the rest to the husband.
The husband appealed on the ground that there was no cognizable dis-
pute before the court in that their union was wholly religious in nature
and that treating it as a matter of state concern violated all manner of
rights guaranteed by the United States and Texas Constitutions. 37
Though there seem to have been ample facts to support the conclusion
that theirs was a valid informal marriage in addition to being a valid cere-
31. A far greater change was made by what was said to be a non-substantive statutory
revision affecting the purchasers of debtors' property at a judicial sale. Prior to its non-
substantive revision in 1985 the statute, now identified as TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 34.046 (Vernon 1997), provided that a purchaser at a judicial sale takes as a bo-
nafide purchaser from the debtor except for the creditor provoking the sale. In 1985 when
the section was reenacted the exception was omitted. The Houston First District appellate
court has since held that no purchaser at a constable's sale taking a quitclaim deed can take
as a bonafide purchaser with respect to flaws in the debtor's title. Diversified, Inc. v. Hall,
23 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
32. See Joseph W. M'Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 47 SMU L. REV. 1161,
1192 n.290 (1994).
33. See Waite v. Waite, 150 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no
pet.).
34. Waite v. Helmondollar, 881 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 2003).
35. Waite v. Waite & Helmondollar, No. 2030017, 2004 WL 758394 (Ala. Civ. App.
Apr. 9, 2004).
36. See Waite, 150 S.W.3d at 800 n.3.
37. See id. at 801. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 55 SMU
L. REV. 1035, 1039 (2002).
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monial one, it was with respect to the latter that the principal argument
was directed. In response to the husband's appeal, the Houston Four-
teenth District Court rejected the husband's constitutional arguments and
affirmed the decision of the trial court with a dissent on one point involv-
ing Texas constitutional law.38 The husband filed a motion for rehearing.
Despite the appellant's repeated proffer of his constitutional arguments,
the Houston court rejected his appeal. 39
In the divorce proceeding, the husband's counsel intervened to recover
attorney's fees and expenses, and the trial court severed the intervention,
presumably to deflect any objection to the propriety of the intervention. 40
The husband and his counsel settled their dispute with a Rule 11 agree-
ment. 41 The husband-client thereupon tendered his check for the agreed
amount but declined to execute a release of all future claims. Though the
language of the proposed release is not quoted in the opinion of the ap-
pellate court that affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
the attorney, it appears that the agreement was meant to cover no more
than fees for past services and prior expenses. In reversing the judgment
of the trial court in favor of the attorney, the appellate court held that the
attorney's motion for summary judgment did not give fair notice for sum-
mary judgment under Rule 166a(c) and (i). 4 2
C. STATE EMPLOYMENT
The Texas Attorney General rendered an opinion43 concerning the ef-
fect of the specific provisions of the Tax Code" that prohibit the hiring of
a relative within the first degree (including a spouse or a child) of a per-
son already in the position of an employer by an appraisal district. In this
instance, the proposed appointee as a chief appraiser was a son of an
employee of the district for fifteen years. The question was put in terms
of the present employee's having to give up her position in order to make
way for her son's appointment as a chief appraiser and thus a member of
the board of the appraisal district. Thus the resulting appointment would
cause too close a relationship between an existing employee and a pro-
spective employer rather than the reverse, which more commonly arises
in such proposed hirings. Although the general provisions for hiring and
38. Waite v. Waite, 64 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.),
noted in Joseph. W. McKnight, op. cit. supra note 37, and Waite v. Waite, 76 S.W.3d 222,
223 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.), commented on in Joseph W. MC
Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 56 SMU L. REV. 1659, 1692 (2003).
39. Waite, 150 S.W.3d at 801-02.
40. The Ethics Committee of the State Bar of Texas has made it clear that it is im-
proper for a lawyer to secure a judgment for legal fees against his client in the same suit as
that in which he is representing his client. Texas Ethics Committee Opinion 374, 37 TEX.
B.J. 1085 (1974). See Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no
pet.).
41. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 11; Waite v. Woodard, Hall & Primm, 137 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.
App.-Houston f1st Dist. 2004, no pet. h.); TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
42. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c), (i).
43. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. GA-0187 (May 12, 2004).
44. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.05(F) (Vernon 2001).
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employment in the Government Code 45 allow no exception to the general
nepotism rule in this particular instance, the Attorney General applied
the specific rule of the Tax Code. It was pointed out in the opinion that
the provision of the Tax Code enacted in 1989, though specifically made
subject to other identical provisions of the Government Code, was not
meant to be subject to the particular exception to the nepotism rule in the
Government Code.46
In another opinion, the Attorney General addressed a question with
respect to a county commissioner's access to county records in making an
investigation of the activity of a former commissioner and his wife con-
cerning their involvement in certain criminal acts.47 The Attorney Gen-
eral concluded that, as a general rule, a commissioner's court may
conduct such an inquiry but not those involving an individual commis-
sioner in most, but not all, circumstances. 48 In this instance, the investiga-
tion concerned medical records of the former commissioner and his wife
in relation to claims by them to medical benefits provided by the county.
After discussion of a number of situations involving breach of primary
rules that may be involved in some investigations, the Attorney General
declined to express an opinion on investigations of particular documents
that might be related to a full investigation.49
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. COMMUNITY PRESUMPTION
In two cases the Fort Worth Court of Appeals imposed a very strong
evidentiary showing to satisfy the burden of proof necessary to overcome
the presumption that all marital acquisitions are community property.
The first of these decisions, on which the court relies in the second, is the
more striking. In 1997 the Texas Legislature enunciated that a clear and
convincing standard of evidence is required to overcome the community
presumption.50 In Boyd v. Boyd51 the divorce court dealt with the hus-
band's claim for economic contribution of his separate funds used to dis-
charge a mortgage on community property under section 3.403.52 On
appeal from the decision of the divorce court that had accepted the hus-
band's evidence to sustain his claim, the wife stated that the husband had
merely asserted the use of separate funds without proving their separate
source. On appeal the wife argued that at the time of the trial at which
she was present but at a time that she was undergoing psychiatric treat-
45. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 573.062 (Vernon 1994).
46. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. GA-0187 at 5 (May 12, 2004). The opinion goes on at
great length to make these simple points.
47. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. GA-0138 (Jan. 21, 2004).
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id. at 10.
50. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003 (Vernon 1998).
51. 131 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). This was the Boyds' third
trip to the Fort Worth appellate court.
52. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.403 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
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ment. The husband put on his evidence of separate property contribution
and asked his wife (who was without counsel) whether she had any ques-
tions. She responded that she had questions but would forego asking
them.53 The appellate court noted further that in her presentation of her
own case the wife attempted to offer evidence of an appraisal of the com-
munity property in issue, but the court sustained the husband's objection
to her evidence on the ground that she had failed to respond to his inter-
rogatories. After the trial court had made its division of community
property, the wife filed a motion for a new trial on the basis of her incom-
petence at the trial as a result of being under the influence of psychiatric
drugs.54 The court denied her motion and on that denial the wife took
her appeal which was particularly directed to her husband's failure to
prove the alleged separate character of property he used to discharge the
mortgage on community property. Without any discussion of the proce-
dure or rules of evidence followed at the trial, the appellate court con-
cluded that the husband had failed to trace his alleged separate funds
from a separate source in order to meet the clear and convincing standard
of this burden of proof. In putting aside the husband's reliance on New-
land v. Newland,55 the court pointed out that the husband's testimony in
that case was corroborated by records and other documentary evidence
whereas his testimony in this instance was uncorroborated 56 and would
produce a "grossly undervalued" community estate.
5 7
In Irvin v. Parker58 the Fort Worth court reiterated its stand in Boyd on
the clear and convincing evidence rule in another tracing case. The prop-
erty in issue was an annuity claimed by the deceased wife's estate as her
separate property. Again the procedural posture of the case was unusual
but not commented on by the court. The jury found that the wife had
purchased the annuity with her separate funds but that she did not agree
to her husband's ownership of the annuity as shown by the contract itself
negotiated with the husband's participation. On appeal her surviving
husband asserted that the decedent's administrator's evidence had failed
to meet the clear and convincing standard set forth by section 3.003. In
supporting the estate's claim of separate character of the annuity and its
proceeds, the trial court found in favor of the ownership of the annuity as
the wife's separate property. The wife's estate relied on the husband's
failure to object to the wife's administrator's inventory of the separate
estate including the annuity. 59 In an abandoned pleading the husband
admitted that the source of the payment for the annuity appeared to have
been "Noma's [the wife's] money" and that admission was admitted into
53. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 609.
54. Id. at 610.
55. 529 S.W.2d 105, 107-08 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ dism'd).
56. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 614-17.
57. Id. at 618. For what may have amounted to a significantly overvalued community
estate, see Wilson v. Wilson, 132 S.W.3d 533 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no
pet.).
58. 139 S.W.3d 703 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
59. Id. at 709-11.
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evidence by the trial court. On the basis that testimony to the effect that
the annuity was paid for with money from the wife's bank account,60 and
the hypothesis that the money used by the wife was her separate property
inherited from her deceased husband, the trial court assumed that there
was no other source from whence the payment might have come. The
wife's administrator nevertheless failed to corroborate the husband's re-
mark as to the separate source of the property used to pay for the annuity
policy. The appellate court held that the estate's evidence failed to meet
the clear and convincing standard.61 In light of the peculiar facts and the
apparent odd state of the trial records in both cases, the conclusions in
both cases may be acceptable but their standing as authorities for the
burden of proof under section 3.003 seems dubious.
The character of the husband's interest in patents existing or applied
for during a marriage was in issue in Sheshtawy v. Sheshtawy.62 In re-
sponse to the husband's reliance on the doctrine of federal preemption of
the subject the San Antonio Court of Appeals relied on the federal ap-
peals court's decision in Rodrique v. Rodrique63 that there was no indica-
tion of the intent of Congress to preempt applicable state law. In this
instance, therefore, the failure to prove the husband's separate ownership
of the patents required remand for redivision of the community property.
B. REIMBURSEMENT
In Sheshtawy v. Sheshtawy,64 the trial court sought to shift liability for a
loan made to both spouses (with a lien on the wife's separate property) to
the husband alone and to put a lien on the husband's separate realty to
secure his obligation thus imposed. Without any showing that the hus-
band's separate realty had benefited from the liability, the court held
that fixing a lien on the property was not justifiable.65
In Ginsburg v. Chernoffl6 the issue before the court, though not clearly
enunciated, was whether a claim for any right of reimbursement might be
successfully asserted against a third person with whom a divorcing spouse
sought to hide community property. The facts of the case were therefore
similar to those in Schlueter v. Schlueter,67 though in that case the trial
court's judgment against the third party recipient was not appealed by
him. The court in this instance relied on the Texas Supreme Court's fac-
tually-closer 1960 decision in Cohrs v. Scott68 in which the court denied
recovery for reimbursement against the transferee after the divorcing
60. "It was Norma's money" was his actual statement. Id. at 709.
61. Id. at 712.
62. 150 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
63. 218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Alsenz v. Alsenz, 101 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Tex.
App.-Houston f1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); John A. Thomas, Who Owns the Invention?,
62 TEX. B.J. 996, 1002 (1999).
64. Sheshtawy, 150 S.W.3d at 779.
65. Id.
66. 137 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
67. 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1998).
68. 228 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. 1960).
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spouses entered into an agreement settling all their differences with re-
spect to division of the community estate. In Ginsburg, the wife admitted
in her deposition that through her presumably solely owned company she
had made a fraudulent transfer of community funds to the corporate de-
fendant for the purpose of hiding the property during the divorce pro-
ceeding. Unlike the facts in Schlueter but "strikingly similar" 69 to those
in Cohrs, the husband and wife had later reached a mediated settlement
of their differences and provided for an agreed division of the marital
estate. 70 In Ginsburg, the trial court granted the transferee's motion for
summary judgment and the husband appealed. Though the property set-
tlement agreement preserved the husband's rights against the transferee
just as the agreement in Cohrs had preserved the plaintiff's rights against
the transferee in that instance, the appellate court concluded in Ginsburg
that as a matter of law the husband's rights were foreclosed by the
spouses' settlement agreement which therefore amounted to an implied
third party beneficiary contract though not so termed by the court.71 It is
worthy of note that in the course of its opinion the court quoted the deci-
sion in Cohrs "that the fraud having herein been initiated and carried out
mainly by the husband [in Cohrs] the wife must look primarily to him and
his property to right the wrong."' 72 In Carnes v. Meador,73 the court also
stated that a defrauded spouse should first seek recovery against the
transferring spouse before proceeding against the transferee. But in
Ginsburg further proceeding against the transferee was precluded by the
agreement with the transferor-spouse, which as a matter of law precluded
any claim against the transferee despite the independent claim for con-
version against the transferee that was provided at common law.
III. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF
MARITAL PROPERTY
A. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY
The principal issue before the bankruptcy court in In re Chesnut74 was
whether certain realty was part of the husband's bankruptcy estate. 75 The
property had been acquired by the wife without any apparent participa-
tion of her husband in the transaction. The deed to the property recited
that it was conveyed as to the wife as her separate property and that she
had given her note for at least some of the purchase money and title
policy. In her husband's Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, in the course
of the pending divorce, he nevertheless claimed a community property
interest in the realty and gave notice of that assertion to the holder of the
69. Ginsburg, 137 S.W.3d at 237.
70. Id. at 234.
71. Id. at 237.
72. Id. at 236 (quoting Cohrs, 228 S.W.2d at 133).
73. 533 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref d. n.r.e.).
74. 311 B.R. 446 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
75. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).
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wife's note who had brought a proceeding against his wife to foreclose
her delinquent note. The note-holder nevertheless pursued foreclosure
on the assumption that the property was the wife's separate property,
and the debtor-husband filed an adversary proceeding against the note-
holder alleging a breach of the automatic stay by the note-holder's pro-
ceeding under the Bankruptcy Code.7 6 The bankruptcy court thereupon
sanctioned the note-holder. In his appeal to the district judge the note-
holder asserted that the bankrupt had no interest in the property and that
there was therefore no violation of the automatic stay. Although the
federal judge suggested that the debtor-husband might have had a claim
for "economic contribution, '77 the opinion was devoid of any intimation
of any right of reimbursement or suggestion of community discharge of
any lien on the property. 78 Nor is there any apparent reference in the
opinion to the possible use of community property solely or jointly man-
aged by the husband to make any payment for the purchase of the land.
Without any assertion of such an interest, there was no violation of the
automatic stay because there was no interest of the debtor that was vio-
lated. In the court's view, mere failure to overcome the community pre-
sumption was not enough to trigger the automatic stay; that result could
have been achieved only by a showing that the community property used
to purchase the realty was solely or jointly managed by the husband.79
The property in issue was seemingly subject to the sole management of
the wife and not subject to liability for the husband's debts. But the awk-
ward fact was that the property was not proved to be subject to the wife's
sole management. The recital in the deed does not show that the prop-
erty was her separate property. Nor was it stated that the seller had
looked only to the wife's separate property for payment and the husband
was apparently not a party to the transaction so that he would be es-
topped in denying the wife's separate title.80 Nor was it asserted that the
lender had looked solely to the wife's separate property for repayment of
the loan to her. Even if the note had been a non-recouse note the truth
of the recital was still in question.81
The property was, of course, presumptively community property if ac-
quired during the marriage. The court seems to have assumed that the
recital of the wife's separate ownership rebutted that presumption.
Though such a recital scares away many such potential claimants such as
the husband and his creditors, the recital is not controlling if the husband
was not a party to the transaction and a separate source of the purchase
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1998).
77. Chesnut, 311 B.R. at 450.
78. The judge was evidently using the phrase as a reference to possible use of commu-
nity property in making the purchase (a community ownership interest) rather than a term
of art under section 3.403.
79. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994).
80. See Gleich v. Bongio, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937); Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908(Tex. 1967).
81. See Heidenheimer Bros. v. McKeen, 63 Tex. 229 (1885).
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money is not proved.82 If the husband is not so estopped to assert a
claim, it may be shown that the recital is false in whole or in part.83 Or he
may show that even if the land is community property, it is actually sub-
ject to his joint management and thus subject to his debts.84 But if the
land is community property and can be shown to be subject to the wife's
sole management, it is still subject to the husband's tortious liabilities.8 5
The bankruptcy proceeding under Chapter 13 dealt with in In re Pow-
ell86 was filed while the wife's divorce proceeding was underway. In her
bankruptcy the wife found it advisable to hire special counsel prior to
filing for bankruptcy, and it was in connection with approval of the attor-
ney's fees (both before and after her filing) that the bankruptcy court
dealt. The husband filed an objection to all the fees and expenses as an
administrative (first priority) expense. Though the court disapproved
some elements of the fees as claims, 87 it approved the amount of the fee
(about $200 an hour) as reasonable and allowed the claims for the pre-
petition fees as a claim against the bankruptcy estate and the post-bank-
ruptcy fees as administrative expense.88
C. EXEMPT PROPERTY
1. Definition of a Homestead
In Kendall Builders, Inc. v. Chessa,89 the Austin Court of Appeals con-
sidered the acquisition of a Texas homestead by a husband and wife and
their large family who had previously made their home in California for
several years. Transferred to Austin by his employer, the husband moved
to Texas in 2000, and both spouses thereafter established their voting
rights, acquired Texas driver's licenses, registered a car, and opened a
joint checking account in Austin. They also bought a house, which they
began to renovate for the family's occupancy. During much of the period
of renovation the husband occupied the garage apartment on the prop-
erty while most of his family remained in California. Several months af-
ter the work began, a dispute arose between the homeowner and the
builder who filed a mechanic's and materialman's lien on the property for
his work, though the lien filed was not one which would reach homestead
property as the appellate court concluded. The court relied on the testi-
mony of both the husband and the wife that their primary residence was
in Austin, and the California authorities were left to recover the value, if
82. See Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1967).
83. See JOSEPH W. MCKNIGHT & WILLIAM J. REPPY, JR., TEXAS MATRIMONIAL PROP-
ERTY LAW 80 n.3 (7th ed. 2003), where the authorities are set out and discussed.
84. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.202(c) (Vernon 1998).
85. Id. § 3.202(d).
86. 314 B.R 567 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004). Although the matter was ultimately con-
verted to a Chapter 11 case, the court pointed out that court-authorization is not required
for a bankrupt's hiring of special counsel in a Chapter 13 case, and the opinion of the court
addresses all of the fee requests as in connection with Chapter 13 matters. Id. at 569.
87. Id. at 571-72.
88. Id. at 572.
89. 149 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
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any, of their continuing enjoyment of their California homestead. The
court held that the evidence was factually and legally sufficient to support
the trial court's holding that the landowners established a homestead.
In Snyder v. Zayler9o a homeowner who conveyed her home by a war-
ranty deed to her children nine months prior to her filing for bankruptcy.
She continued to live there before and after her petition was filed. The
question was whether she could can maintain her homestead claim. In
her petition she had claimed an "equitable interest" in the property as
her homestead where she continued to live. That the property was the
owner's homestead initially was not questioned - only the matter of con-
tinued occupancy. The trustee in bankruptcy brought suit against the
grantee-children to set aside the transfer as a fraud on creditors. The
children failed to respond and the trustee took a judgment against them
by default. The bankruptcy court thereupon granted the trustee's motion
for a turnover order against the children and denied the bankrupt's claim
to a homestead in the property. The bankrupt appealed to the district
judge, who found for the homestead claimant in reliance on the dubious
authority of In re Moody.91 The district court held (1) that the claimant
might challenge the proceeding against the children although she was not
a party to the proceeding against them and (2) that the transfer was a
sham and therefore void and without any effect as a basis for an assertion
of abandonment. The trustee was therefore barred from contesting the
homestead claim because of his initial failure to make a timely
objection.92
In Cullers & Henry v. James,93 the Supreme Court of Texas held in 1886
that a moveable structure for a family's occupancy and not intended to
adhere to a lessor's realty on which it is placed retains its character as
personalty though used as a family's residence. In 1948 in Gann v. Mont-
gomery,94 the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals considered another
form of livable personalty, a house trailer on the property of a family
member and connected to utilities there. The court intimated that as long
as the trailer was resting on land to which the owner had a right of occu-
pancy, the trailer would be treated as exempt from seizure by the owner's
creditor, but if the trailer were moved to a place where the owner had no
interest, the property lost whatever exempt status it had acquired. In
1969 the Austin Court of Civil Appeals held in Capitol Aggregates v.
Walker95 that a modern mobile home moored in a space in a mobile-
home-park rented by the owner would be exempt to the homeowner as
long as the structure remained moored to the land to which the owner
90. 309 B.R. 272 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
91. Id. at 276 (citing In re Moody, 862 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1989), commented on in
Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 43 Sw. L.J. 1 at 21 (1989)).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (2000) (within 30 days following the creditors' meeting under 11
U.S.C. § 341 (1994)).
93. 1 S.W. 314 (Tex. 1886).
94. 210 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
95. 448 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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thereby had an interest. In that instance, the court stated that a month to
month tenancy was a sufficient interest in the land to support the owner's
claim of exemption. Capitol Aggregates has since been accepted as giving
a homestead right to the property when so moored but with the clear
implication that if the mobile home is taken from its mooring, as for ex-
ample when it is on the road, it is subject to a creditor's seizure for an
unsecured debt.9
6
In In re Morris97 a bankrupt owner of a very luxurious four bedroom
houseboat, where he made his residence when not staying with relatives
ashore, claimed it as exempt property. After discussing Cullers & Henry
at great length 98 but merely citing Capitol Aggregates, Judge Rodriquez
of the San Antonio Division of the federal district court went on to dis-
cuss bankruptcy cases from Connecticut, North Dakota, Alabama, Ken-
tucky and Florida. 99 In every one of the cases the boat was treated under
local law as exempt property by the bankruptcy court. The court never-
theless denied the exempt character of the houseboat under Texas law.
But if the houseboat was moored rightfully when the bankruptcy petition
was filed, the houseboat would seem to be property exempt as a part of
the leased or rented mooring. 1° ° It nevertheless follows from Texas law
that if at any time a houseboat or yacht is cast from its moorings for a
cruise on the water, during the duration of the cruise it is subject to
seizure by a secured creditor. But such a seizure after filing of the peti-
tion can be stayed by the bankruptcy court.
2. Liens on Homestead Property
In 1992 prior to his marriage, the husband procured a loan secured by a
lien on unimproved land. The lender-bank assigned the note to the de-
fendant bank. The note was repaid in 1996 and the lien was released.
The couple, however, married in 1998. During the following year the
husband obtained a further loan from the defendant bank and the loan
instrument was drawn as a renewal and extension of the earlier lien. The
husband and wife joined in executing a deed of trust lien on their home-
stead to secure that loan. After the husband's death the widow in posses-
sion brought suit to invalidate the deed of trust. In sustaining the
judgment of the trial court the Eastland Court of Appeals in Chase Man-
hattan Mortgage Corporation v. Cook' ° 1 held that the lien was void be-
cause a lien against a homestead cannot be created by a renewal of a
96. Id. at 832, 835.
97. 316 B.R. 246 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
98. Id. at 249-50.
99. Id. at 250-51.
100. It is also worthy of mention that a "boat" is listed among tools of trade in TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a)(4) (Vernon 2000) and that the reference was meant to em-
body inclusion of a ferry boat in the prior statute. Hence if a houseboat is used as a tool of
trade, it qualifies as exempt property even if unmoored in a rented space.
101. 141 S.W.3d 709 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, no pet.).
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prior lien that has been dissolved of payment. 10 2
Holding proceeds of homestead property in the registry of a court is
not the same as imposing a lien on that property but it may temporarily
have that effect. In In re Garza,10 3 the divorce court awarded the hus-
band the community homestead and ordered him to pay his wife the
value of her interest in the property. Each spouse was ordered to pay his
or her own attorney's fees. At the husband's behest, the trial court pro-
vided further that if the wife's appeal to the characterization and division
of property should be granted on appeal, the husband's appellate attor-
ney's fees of $25,000 would be paid out of the sum on deposit to pay for
the wife's interest in the home. 10 4 The wife brought a suit for a writ of
mandamus to vacate the court's order.
The appellate court to which the writ of mandamus was directed con-
cluded that it was necessary to order the husband to deposit funds for the
wife's payment into the court's registry. But considering the scope of the
wife's appeal, the court concluded that the amount of the ultimate award
to the wife (including the value of the homestead) could not be presently
determined. Further, in light of the wife's assertion that she would need
some of the impounded funds for her living expenses pending appeal and
the court's fear that such funds might be exhausted if they were presently
distributed to her and later recharacterized, the impounded funds could
not then be effectively redivided. 10 5 The appellate court observed fur-
ther that if the wife's appeal was unsuccessful, the husband's attorney's
fees for the protection of the homestead property for which the husband
was primarily responsible and the support of the minor children awarded
to him might have to be paid from those funds.10 6 The court was careful
to point out, however, that the husband's attorney's fees should not be
imposed only on the wife's share of the homestead and for that reason
also they should be held in the registry of the court. 10 7
The facts underlying the dispute in In re Jay'08 related to situations
existing prior to the amendment to the Article XVI, section 51 of the
Texas Constitution in late 1999.109 That amendment provided that a busi-
102. Id. at 714 (citing Southland Life Inc. Co. v. Barrett, 172 S.W.2d 997, 1000 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.)).
103. 153 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
104. Id. at 100.
105. Id. at 100-01.
106. Id. at 101.
107. Id. at 102-03.
108. 308 B.R. 251 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003).
109. The proposed constitutional amendment cited here was initially presented by
S.J.R. No. 22 at the regular legislative session of 1999 for the voter's consideration on
November 2, 1999. Pursuant to provisions set-forth in Article XVII, § I of the Texas Con-
stitution then and thereafter in effect, such amendments do not become effective until the
election returns show that "a majority of the votes cast have been in favor of the amend-
ment." S.J.R. No. 22 did not prescribe an effective date for the adoption of the amend-
ment, but Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 1510, § 7(a), enacting statutes implementing the amendment
when adopted, gave January 1, 2000 as the effective date of the amendment to Tex. Prop.
Code Ann. § 41.002 if the amendment "is approved by the voters." At the very latest,
constitutional amendments are considered duly effective when the current Governor can-
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ness homestead must be contiguous to the residential homestead of the
claimant. In this instance the homeowners also owned a .85 acre tract of
land nearby but not contiguous to the tract where their home was located.
Their business building was located on the .85 acre tract. The location of
the residential homestead was not mentioned but it was clearly in the
same urban community as non-contiguous business premises and both
pieces of realty together must have amounted to about one acre. Prior to
the adoption of the 1999 constitutional amendment, that business tract
was claimed as the debtor's business homestead, which they sought to
renovate. In November, 1999 the landowners (later Chapter 13 debtors)
negotiated with a lender to finance improvement of the property on
which the owner had never lived but maintained a business there. The
lender agreed to build the new facility and lease it to the landowners-
borrowers. The first written instrument between them was the lease
agreement of December 15, 1999 giving the borrower's a lease for a term
of twenty years beginning on April 1, 2000. The lender had told the land-
owners that conveyance the business tract was necessary to the transac-
tion but the landowners' conveyance of the realty to the lender-builder
(later a Chapter 11 debtor in Oklahoma) as security for the loan did not
occur until January 15, 2000. As a result of the borrower's failure to
make payments on the loan, a justice court awarded possession of the
business tract to the builder. The borrowers filed a Chapter 13 petition.
The lender then filed his Chapter 11 proceeding in Oklahoma in which
the couple filed a claim as unsecured creditors. The couple did not, how-
ever, file any objection to confirmation of the lender's plan and it was
confirmed in 2003.
In their Chapter 13 proceeding the debtors claimed the business tract
as their homestead which they asserted had been transferred to the
lender as a mere pretended sale. The basis of the homestead claim to the
business tract was the language of section 51 prior to the 1999 amend-
ment at which time it was not required that the home and business prem-
ises had to be contiguous. The borrower-claimant argued that the date of
the transaction with the lender occurred on December 15, 1999 whereas
the lender placed the transaction at the date of conveyance in mid-Janu-
ary, 2000. The court held that the title to property dated from the execu-
tion and delivery of the deed but subject to the relation-back doctrine.110
It had been said in Cain v. Texas in 1994 that the relation-back doctrine
"enables the court to arrive at conclusions that will effectuate justice
while maintaining simultaneously the appearance of logical consis-
tency."'11 The doctrine is applied to many sorts of real property transac-
tions,112 and the court interpreted this contract of sale as relating back to
vasses the document containing the proposed changes (usually three calendar weeks after
the date of the vote).
110. Jay, 308 B.R. at 265 (citing Stephens County Museum, Inc. v. Swenson, 517 S.W.2d
257, 261 (Tex. 1974)).




a time prior to delivery of the deed.11 3 In this instance, the landowners
and the lender had reached their agreement for the transfer well before
the deed was executed and delivered. 114 Negotiations between them
must have preceded the December 15, 1999 date when they entered into
a retail-store-lease of the premises.' 15 The need for the conveyance of
mid-January, 2000 was to provide title to the lender so that the lender
might lease the facilities back to the debtors as part of the transaction to
which they had already agreed. Thus from the borrower's position the
property transferred was the debtors' business homestead when they ef-
fectively negotiated to transfer it and the transfer thus related back to a
time before the effective date of the constitutional amendment and thus
the borrowers would prevail. In comments on the court's construction of
the amendment the court seemed to say that under the amendment the
homestead claimant must live on the tract where the business premises
are located. An interpretation more consistent with the present language
of section 51 is that the place of business is located on a tract merely
contiguous to that where the home is located. 116
It was argued by the debtors that the constitutional amendment did not
have real effect until its statutory implementation by Property Code sec-
tion 41.002(a) 117 of which the effective date was January 1, 2000.118 The
court rejected that argument in that the constitutional amendment was
self-executing. 1 9 The court's conclusion was that the constitutional
amendment was effective as of December 15, 1999,120 but the nature of
the homestead claim already established was not affected. 121 Section
41.002(a) provides that the new definition of a business homestead ap-
plies to all homesteads in the state whenever created. As of December
15, 1999, the old definition continued to apply, hence on January 1, 2000
when the statute became effective the tract had already become a home-
stead.122 The overt acts of using the property for their business activities
demonstrated its business homestead character and its need for that pur-
113. Id. at 265-66.
114. Id. at 266-67.
115. Jay, 308 B.R. at 269.
116. Id. at 274.
117. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(a) (Vernon 2002).
118. The prior language of section 51 stated: "If used for the-purpose of an urban home
or as a place to exercise a calling or business, the [urban] homestead.., shall consist of not
more than one acre." That provision makes it clear that the urban and residential home-
steads were not generally expected to be on adjacent tracts at that time.
119. Jay, 308 B.R. at 272-73.
120. Id. at 274.
121. See Valley Bank of Nevada v. Skeen, 401 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Tex. 1975), affd, 532
F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1976); In re John Taylor Co., 935 F.2d 75, 78 (5th Cir. 1991). But see
Dallas Power & Light Co. v. Loomis, 672 S.W.2d 309, 310 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 39 Sw. L. J.
1, 17-18 (1985). But a constitutional provision may actually provide for its retrospective
effect. In re Starns, 52 B.R. 405, 413 (S.D. Tex. 1985), discussed in Joseph W. McKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, 40 Sw. L.J. 1, 17-18 (1986).
122. Jay, 308 B.R. at 276-77.
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pose.123 It was therefore unnecessary that a particular intent on the part
of the owners in that respect to be independently demonstrated.
1 2 4
The terms by which the debtors transfer their homestead property to
lenders are interpreted in light of Property Code section 41.006,125 which
provides that a purported sale of a homestead is void if the purchase
price is less than the fair market price and the seller takes a lease from
the buyer for lease payments that exceed the fair rental value of the prop-
erty as payment for a loan. Such a transaction is therefore treated as a
loan, and all payments made in excess of a fair sale price are to be re-
turned to the transferor along with interest in favor of the transferor.
126
The taking of such a deed is also considered a deceptive trade practice.
Hence the sale is void, and no lien attaches to the homestead. 127 In re-
sponse to the lender's argument in Jay that the debtors failed to prove all
relevant facts, the court responded that section 41.006 does not provide
an exclusive remedy in such cases. "Texas courts employ equity to look
past the literal language of a deed to ascertain the true intention of the
parties... to... be a mortgage."' 21 8 The Property Code thus supplies a
statutory remedy in addition to that at common law.' 2 9 The intent of the
parties is of particular importance in construing such a transaction as an
actual sale or a pretended sale and the testimony of the parties is there-
fore especially important. 130 The court reviewed the evidence and
showed that the parties did not intend a genuine sale "but intended to
disguise a constitutionally prohibited mortgage.' 13 ' What the owners had
in fact agreed to as consideration "was not purchase money, but a con-
struction loan, to be repaid over twenty years with the .85 acre tract serv-
ing as security.' 32 The court set aside the deed and lease of the business
homestead property and denied the existence of any lien on the home-
stead property.' 33 The court further pointed out that because the pre-
tended sale was void, the business tract was not part of the builder's
Chapter 11 estate and thus would not pass to the purported good-faith
purchaser from the Chapter 11 trustee. 34 In this case, the purchaser had
not offered evidence of his bona fides.135
123. Id. at 277-78.
124. Id. at 279-80.
125. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.006 (Vernon 2002).
126. Id. § 41.006(a).
127. Id. § 41.006(b).
128. Jay, 308 B.R. at 280 (citing Johnson v. Cherry, 726 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1987), which the
provisions of § 41.006(b) enacted in 1987, seem to codify); see Phillip D. Weller, Real Prop-
erty, 42 Sw. L.J. 295, 310 (1988).
129. Jay, 308 B.R. at 281-82 (citing Cash Am. Int'l, Inc. v. Bennett, 35 S.W.3d 12, 16
(Tex. 2000)); Coppedge v. Colonial Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 721 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
130. Jay, 308 B.R. at 284-89.
131. Id. at 289.
132. Id. at 290.
133. Id. at 291.
134. The court anticipated a damages hearing to determine the builder's claim.
135. Jay, 308 B.R. at 291.
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It is striking that the same lender was twice a party to appellate litiga-
tion involving the same sort of question within a very short period of
time. In the first of these cases, Doody v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co.,1 3 6
the Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the constitutional requirements of
a validly secured home-equity loan and concluded that the loan must not
only be made without personal recourse against the borrower-owner but
also that the loan must meet further requirements enumerated in the
Texas Constitution 137 or else the loan is void and the lender is without
recourse. But once the lender's failure to include those protections for
the borrower is realized, the lender is allowed to cure those omissions.
Doody came to the Texas Supreme Court by a certified question from
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court held that a violation of the
rules for a home-equity loan under section 50(a)(6)(E) (overcharge of
fees) did not invalidate the lender's lien if the overcharge was refunded
when revealed. 138 Compliance with the curative provision of the section
50(a)(6)(Q)(x) saves the validity of the loan and its lien. 139 The court
rejected the argument that reliance on the "cure mechanism" might cause
lenders to disregard the protection of homeowner-borrowers given by the
Constitution by saying that "a lender's unlawful business activities may
subject it to liability under federal and state laws. . . ." Moreover, as the
Doody case explains, a lender has little business incentive not to comply
with the lender-requirements, because the lender's business's success de-
pends largely on customer's satisfaction and the lender's reputation in the
community. 140
For a century and a quarter, 141 the Texas Constitution allowed a home-
stead to be given only for securing purchase-money loans, repair and im-
provement loans, and state taxes on the property. 142 In response to
persistent demands of lenders to expand their loan revenues, a constitu-
tional amendment was approved in 1997 to allow home-equity loans for
any purpose, but with some protection for homeowners. After Doody
revealed shortcomings of the constitutional provisions, new provisions to
"clarify" the Constitution were proposed and adopted in the further in-
terest of lenders in 2003.
The facts underlying the dispute in the second case, Adams v. Ameri-
quest Mortgage Co. (In re Adams),143 arose while the amendment of 2003
was being prepared. In the purchase of their home in 1996, the home-
owners gave a purchase money lien for that part of the purchase money
136. 49 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. 2001).
137. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(c).
138. Doody, 49 S.W.3d at 342-43.
139. Id. at 345-46.
140. Id. at 346-47.
141. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 51 SMU. L. REV. 1047,
1065 (1998).
142. The liability of Texas homesteads and other property exempt from creditors'
claims under state law had, of course, been subject to federal taxation under the United
States Constitution.
143. 307 B.R. 549 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004).
[Vol. 58
Husband and Wife
owed. In 2000, after compliance of the requisites for a home-equity loan,
the owners refinanced the loan and also acquired additional funds. In
2002, the couple refinanced their 2000 loan with a different lender, re-
cently engaged in the Doody litigation. The new loan was not handled as
a home-equity loan but simply as a refinancing of a purchase money note
and lien, and the loan documents specifically stated that the loan was not
an extension of credit as defined by section 50(a)(6), which contains the
provisions a loan must meet to be characterized as a home-equity loan. If
the lien is invalid, the homestead loan is unsecured. 144 Section 50(f) pro-
vides that a refinancing of a loan secured by a homestead must meet the
requirements of section 50(a)(6). After the filing of the debtors' motion
for relief against the lenders in their bankruptcy proceedings, the lender
sent the borrowers a letter seeking to cure the defects of its loan because
a valid refinancing of a home-equity loan must meet the home-equity-
loan standards. Though in this instance the mortgage specifically pro-
vided that "the note is not an extension of credit under sections
50(a)(6) ... article XVI, section 50 of the Texas Constitution," 145 enu-
merated in sections 50(a)(6)(A)-(Q). a46 The objective was to ensure the
validity of its lien. The bankrupt debtors filed an adversary proceeding in
the bankruptcy court against the creditor denying the validity of the loan,
thus to deprive the creditor of his principal and interest and having to
return any amount already paid on the note with interest.147 The creditor
sought to cure the defects of which the debtor complained.
After reviewing the holding of the Texas Supreme Court in Doody, the
bankruptcy court pointed out that it was simply in the position of
prophesying how the Texas court would treat the question before it in the
light of Doody. The court thereupon rejected all arguments of the bor-
rowers in favor of the lender. 148 In a case like Adams, the borrower
should nevertheless rely on a United States Supreme Court case very fa-
miliar to Texas family lawyers, Yiatchos v. Yiatchos.149 There the Court
refused to follow an earlier Texas case before the Court 150 by saying that
the constitutionally authorized congressional act relied on in the earlier
case could not control the later result when used as an instrument of
fraud. 151
3. Personal Property Exemptions
Two cases in the bankruptcy courts dealt with federal personal property
exemptions chosen under section 522(d) 152 in lieu of state exemptions. In
144. Id. at 551.
145. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6).
146. Id. at § 50(a)(6)(A)-(Q).
147. Adams, 307 B.R. at 553 (citing Thomison v. Long Bench Mortgage Co., 176 F.
Supp. 2d 714, 718 (W.D. Tex. 2001), vacated by 2002 WL 32138252 (W.D. Tex. 2002)).
148. Id. at 557-60.
149. 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
150. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
151. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. at 309.
152. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2000).
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both instances the husband and wife filed a joint petition in bankruptcy.
The spouses in In re Bippert153 filed jointly for bankruptcy under Chap-
ter 13 as provided in section 302 of the Bankruptcy Code.154 They
claimed a joint exemption 155 of $30,000 as combined loss for the per-
sonal injury due to the wife-a sort of claim for which there is no exemp-
tion under Texas law, though the marital property character of such a
loss is controlled by Texas law. The trustee took the position that the
husband who was uninjured had no interest in the claim beyond $17,425,
the amount of community loss of the wife's earning power claimable at
the time when the petition was filed under section 522(d)(11)(D). 156 The
husband responded that both he and his wife were entitled to an interest
in the whole amount of $30,000 under section 522(d)(11)(D) "(1) as the
debtor and (2) as an individual to whom the debtor is a dependent,"'1 57
thus constituting a "stacking of their claims.' 58 The trustee's position
was that the property must belong to the husband's estate in order for
him to claim an exemption of it from his estate and that in this case only
the wife could claim loss because she alone was injured. The debtors as-
serted in turn that unless the husband can make a claim in this instance
the provisions of section 522(d)(1)(D) are superfluous. Judge Leif Clark
concluded that as a general rule "property of the estate" under section
522(b) in a joint case means the combined property of each. Thus "[t]he
filing of a joint petition [by spouses] does not result in the automatic sub-
stantive consolidation of the two debtors' estates. '159 Because the cate-
gories of property listed in section 522(d) must be within the debtors'
estates under section 522(b), 160 the categories of section 522(d) "do not
furnish the debtor an independent source of entitlements."' 61 Thus, the
husband individually can claim only "that portion defined in section
522(b) as his property, in this instance his loss of consortium. '162 The
wife's estate is entitled to claim as her separate property recovery, in this
instance, for pain and suffering and disfigurement, as the court put it.163
Under section 541(a)(2)(A), each estate is also entitled to a property in-
terest in the community category of recovery. But the wife's estate (that
of the injured spouse here) is not to exceed $17,425 under section
522(d)(11)(D), and that claim cannot include any amount recovered for
153. 311 B.R. 456 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2004).
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 302 (1978).
155. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D) (2000).
156. Id.
157. Bippert, 311 B.R. at 461. "Dependent" under § 522(a)(1) includes a "spouse
whether or not actually dependent." Id.
158. Id. The court pointed out that "doubling" more precisely expresses this duplicat-
ing of claims from a single incident rather than the common term "stacking" which before
the Bankruptcy Code amendments of 1984 was used to refer to one spouse's choice of a
state exemption and the other's choice of a federal exemption. Id. at 460 n.2.
159. Id. at 464 (quoting Reider v. FDIC, 31 F.3d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir. 1994)).
160. Id. at 465.
161. Id. at 466.
162. Id. at 466-68.
163. Id. at 468.
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"actual pecuniary loss" that is compensation for community loss of earn-
ing power. 164 The husband's estate's exemption can include the same
amount for the community loss. "This [entitlement] puts the selfsame
community property that was in [the wife's] estate into his estate as well
(i.e., they overlap)."' 165 The total of the husband's estate's exemption
claim is subject to the same "dollar cap" as that of the wife's estate. 166
The result is to allow "stacking" from the same source by each spouse's
estate.167
In In re Comeaux,a68 a bankruptcy court dealt with another aspect of
federal personal property exemptions. The debtors claimed exemptions
for three unrelated personal injury claims of uncertain amounts for loss of
future personal earnings and their trustee asserted their entitlement to a
single claim for an aggregate monetary cap amount of $17,425. Despite
the ambiguous language of the Bankruptcy Code, 169 the court concluded
that "a payment on ... account of personal bodily injury" refers to any
payment that may be received, and the couple could therefore assert all
three claims for injury as exempt from their bankruptcy estates. 170
In a decree of divorce the wife in Jones v. American Airlines, Inc.171
was awarded a part of her husband's pension fund, and a QDRO was sent
to his employer's pension trust which evidently mistakenly overpaid the
ex-wife. The ex-wife then deposited the funds into her individual retire-
ment account which she claimed as exempt property under section
42.0021 of the Property Code. 172 The ex-husband then sued in federal
court for the mistaken payment of his interest and received a judgment
against the trust and his former wife,'1 73 but the federal court declined to
proceed in the ex-husband's efforts for collection. The pension trust paid
the ex-husband for its mistake and sought a turnover order from a state
court for the overpayment from the ex-wife. The ex-wife asserted that
the pension trust sought funds that were exempt as a pension interest or
its proceeds. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
turnover order against the ex-wife. The ex-wife was not allowed to pro-
tect funds that were not rightfully hers174 by placing them in a protected
account. Thus the court adopted the same conclusion already reached in
164. Id. at 469 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(E) (2000)). But that section "may" never-
theless allow an exemption for loss of future earnings if that exemption has not already
been used. Id. at 469 n.23.
165. Id. at 470.
166. Id. at 471.
167. Id. at 471-72. The court furnishes an explanatory hypothetical example at 472-73.
168. 305 B.R. 802 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2003).
169. Id. at 806.
170. Id. at 806-07.
171. 131 S.W.3d 261 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
172. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vernon 1998).
173. The federal court said casually that the pension fund was entitled to "equitable
reimbursement." What it meant was that money wrongfully received was subject to
recovery.
174. Jones, 131 S.W.3d at 270.
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similar situations involving a homestead exemption asserted as a fraud.' 75
IV. DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ON DIVORCE
A. PROCEEDINGS FOR DIVORCE
1. Jurisdiction
A recital of jurisdiction and venue in the respondent counter-peti-
tioner's pleading was said in Barnard. v. Barnard176 to be a sufficient ad-
mission of those facts to dispose of his argument that the court may have
lacked jurisdiction and venue. Though jurisdiction cannot be established
by consent, there was no real question in that case that the petitioner had
properly alleged jurisdiction by commencing her suit for divorce in the
county of her domicile, and as for venue she alleged that the county was
her residence for the time required. The respondent's allegation of his
domicile and residence in the same county and the parties' proceeding on
that basis had put the marital res before the court. The husband's real
complaint was that both had failed to offer evidence in support of their
allegations of jurisdiction. 177 In responding to this argument, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's satisfaction with
the allegations and conduct of the parties was a sufficient proof of
jurisdiction.
The jurisdictional frame of the trial for divorce is defined by section
6.301(1). 178 The point to which jurisdiction extends is marked by Rule
329b: 179 for thirty days after granting the divorce the court may act on a
petition by either party or on its own motion to vary the decree. After
that time the court loses its power to act unless the case is remanded by a
higher court. In Johnson v. Ventling,180 a divorce court unsuccessfully
purported to vacate a 1995 divorce in 2001. After cohabitating together
for thirteen years (since 1982) the couple apparently decided to conclude
their relationship. The man was advised, or understood that he was ad-
vised, that the relationship was an informal marriage and that the only
means available for its termination was a divorce. The childless couple
negotiated a settlement agreement to divide the property accumulated by
them and their liabilities and agreed that contractual alimony would be
paid to the woman. These terms were expressed in the decree of divorce
which was signed by the parties and entered by the court in early 1995.
Over the years thereafter, the parties continued to dispute their rights
175. Ill-gotten funds cannot be sheltered from seizure by investment in homestead
property. See Branson v. Standard Hardware, Inc., 874 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1994, no writ); Pace v. McEwen, 617 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, no writ); Baucum v. Texam Oil Corp., 423 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1967,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Curtis Sharp Custom Homes, Inc. v. Glover, 701 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
176. 133 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
177. Id. at 785.
178. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.301(1) (Vernon 1998).
179. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
180. 132 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.).
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and brought motions before the court for enforcement - as they had in
late 1995, again in late 1997, when the man sought to vacate the decree on
the ground that the parties had never been married, and yet again in
1999. The earliest dispute was reconciled and in later ones the court de-
nied relief. In late 2000, the woman again asserted her rights under the
decree, and finally in mid-2001 the court concluded that the decree of
1995 was merely interlocutory and granted the man's non-suit in the pro-
ceeding commenced seven years before. The woman asserted in her ap-
peal from that decree that the trial court's jurisdiction had long since
expired under Rule 329b.181 The Corpus Christi appellate court con-
cluded that a final order had indeed been entered in the matter in 1995
and not having been directly attacked was not subject to later collateral
attack.182 The trial court was thus without jurisdiction to vacate the 1995
judgment in 2001.183
2. Proceeding in forma pauperis
In Boulden v. Boulden,184 the petitioner was a prisoner, and his peti-
tion of indigence (in compliance with Rule 45185) was in the form of a
self-sworn affidavit allowed for a prisoner.186 The clerk, however, over-
looked issuance of notice to the respondent, who might have contested
the plea of indigence, though it is unlikely that the respondent would
have had that concern for the county treasury. 187 The only record of pro-
cess in the case was a subsequent letter by the clerk to the petitioning
prisoner that the case would be dismissed for want of prosecution unless
good cause was shown to maintain the case on the docket.188 Having
been instructed by the clerk's notice that a reply in writing or by tele-
phone would be an unacceptable response, the petitioner filed a bench
warrant to make a personal appearance at the hearing or to participate in
the hearing through a conference call by telephone. He also sought ap-
pointment of an attorney ad litem and filed a motion for leave to appeal
in forma pauperis. No action seems to have been taken by the trial court
in response to these requests,18 9 though it has been suggested that a court
might utilize telephone contact and that a statute specifically authorizing
181. Id. at 177-78.
182. Id. at 178-79.
183. The court wound up its opinion with a mild rebuke to the parties for "playing fast
and loose" with the courts to suit their own purposes, id. at 179, and went on to supply a
brief history of the legal usage of that phrase back to a 1949 decision of the Superior Court
of New Jersey in Stretch v. Watson, 69 A.2d 596, 603 (N.J. 1949), rev'd in part on other
grounds (but without comment on the phrase) 5 N.J. 268, 74 A.2d 597 (N.J. 1950).
184. 133 S.W.3d 884 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
185. TEX. R. Civ. P. 145(1).
186. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 132.001-.003 (Vernon 2002).
187. TEX. R. Civ. P. 145(1). Filing fees are deposited in the county treasury. In earlier
times, an Assistant District Attorney appeared as a matter of course in Dallas County to
object to all paupers' oaths of indigency, but that concern of county government has long
since passed, and the matter is simply left to the judge to whom the oath is presented.
188. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a.
189. Boulden, 133 S.W.3d at 885.
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that sort of procedure should be enacted.190 Though in this matter, the
Dallas Court of Appeals had already issued an order that the district
clerk should supplement the record with the petitioner's affidavit of indi-
gence, the record contained no reference to a contest of the affidavit for
appellate costs or any action taken by the court in response to the con-
test. Apart from issuing the order as directed, nothing else was appar-
ently done by the clerk in these regards. The Dallas Court of Appeals
thereupon suspended the time limit for filing an affidavit of indigence1 91
and accepted the petitioner's motion for leave to appeal. In reliance on
In re Buster,192 the appellate court concluded that the trial court should
allow the prisoner to proceed "by affidavit, deposition, telephone or
other effective means."'1 93 In effect, the appellate court rebuked the trial
court for dismissing the matter for want of prosecution' 9 4 but noted that
"a trial court does not have an independent duty to identify and evaluate
the relevant facts for determining whether to grant an inmate's pro se
application for a bench warrant" to appear personally. 1
95
3. Notice of Trial
In In re Rodriquez,196 the respondent husband was again a prisoner in
the county jail. He had answered the wife's petition but her attorney was
evidently remiss in giving him the full forty-five days required notice of
trial. That oversight of a mandatory requirement demanded reversal.' 97
4. Interim Attorney's Fees
In In re Bielefeld,198 the ex-husband sought a writ of habeas corpus
from a commitment to jail for failure to pay his former wife's interim
attorney's fees. In their divorce proceeding, the husband and wife agreed
to an order that the husband pay temporary spousal support, to make
payments for various purposes, and to pay $3,000 to the wife's attorney.
The husband indicated that he might be able to borrow that sum from his
business, which he claimed as separate property, or from his parents. The
attorney then requested $50,000 for additional fees and expenses that
would be entailed for investigation of the separate character of the busi-
ness. After two hearings the court entered an order that the husband
comply with this request. 99 The order stated that it was based on "the
needs of the applicant as weighed against the ability of the [husband] to
190. See Joseph W. M'Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 57 SMU L. REv. 991,
1021 (2004).
191. TEX. R. Civ. P. 201.
192. 115 S.W.3d 141 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.).
193. Boulden, 133 S.W.3d at 887.
194. Id.
195. Id. (citing In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003)).
196. 149 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet.).
197. Id. at 859-60.
198. 143 S.W.3d 924 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
199. Id. at 925.
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pay."'200 Seven months later the attorney filed a motion for enforcement
of the order and after a hearing the court held the contemnor in both civil
and criminal contempt for failure to pay the ordered amount as "addi-
tional spouse support" and ordered him to jail for thirty days and until
the ordered amount would be paid into the registry of the court.201 The
contemnor thereupon filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After
a divided panel of the appellate court denied the writ, the court sitting en
banc granted the writ because the commitment order was at most for
"conduct violating an implied or inferred order never reduced to writ-
ing" 202 nor had the written order for an advance for interim attorney's
fees specifically "characteriz[ed] those fees and expenses as spousal
support. '203
5. Temporary Order Pending Appeal
In In re Garza,2°4 the husband was awarded the family home, and he
was ordered to pay his wife community funds for her equity interest of
almost $74,000 in the property. The wife appealed the order, and both
parties moved for temporary orders pending appeal. The court ordered
the husband to make his payment into the registry of the court until com-
pletion of the appeal, but if the wife's appeal should be unsuccessful he
would be awarded appellate attorney's fees of $25,000 from that sum. In
her appeal, the wife challenged that order by a writ of mandamus. The
court held that ordering the husband to deposit his payment to the wife
into the registry was appropriate for its safe-keeping. 20 5 In that the wife
testified that she had need for some of those funds for her support pend-
ing appeal, all the funds would not then be available for redivision in the
event of the wife's successful appeal.206 With respect to the payment of
the husband's attorney's fees from the fund, however, the court held that
the order in effect impermissibly encumbered the wife equity interest in
the homestead with a lien for payment of the husband's "contingent at-
torney's fees. ' 20 7
B. DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ON DIVORCE
1. Property Settlement Agreement
In Miller v. Ludeman,20 8 the husband and wife decided to end their
marriage and hired a lawyer to prepare a property settlement for them to
200. Id.
201. Id. at 926-27.
202. Id. at 931.
203. Id.
204. 153 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
205. Id. at 100.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 102-03. The court also held that it lacked authority to issue an injunction or
prohibition to protect all the property pending appeal as those powers could only be exer-
cised to enforce the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 103.
208. 150 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
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divide their accumulated community property as they had agreed. The
agreement was signed by both parties. The husband's wish to renegotiate
the settlement was denied by the wife, and the husband said that he
would leave that matter to the court. In their continuing discussions the
wife told her husband that on the basis of what her attorney told her
about community property rules she had drawn up a list of property that
should be her share and the couple then drafted and executed a substi-
tute-property-settlement-agreement on the basis of which the divorce
court divided the property and ordered the husband to pay the wife
$52,000. After entry of the decree, however, the ex-husband did not pay
the sum ordered, and the ex-wife brought suit for the ordered anticipated
payment. The ex-husband countered with a bill of review based on alle-
gations of the ex-wife's extrinsic fraud. The attorney denied speaking to
either party about division of the property or the definition of community
property. The trial court granted summary judgment to the ex-wife and
denied the bill of review. In affirming these conclusions, the Austin
Court of Appeals pointed out that at the time they negotiated the couple
no longer owed any fiduciary duty to each other and that even if there
had been such a duty the husband failed to investigate his wife's equivo-
cal statements concerning marital property law and to make a contrary
assertion of his rights.209
2. Making the Division
It is a responsibility of parties to a divorce, with assistance of their law-
yers, to inform the court of facts relating to the character of property as
separate or community. In Barnard v. Barnard,210 the parties each
presented an inventory of property claimed as appropriate to be divided
in his or her favor. The trial court evidently expected more information
or argument from the parties after receipt of the husband's draft decree
but got none. The court, nevertheless, failed to identify the separate
property of each party. As to the community property, the commercial
rental property was divided by a ratio of 55/45 and the rest 60/40 in favor
of the wife, who had been the victim of some familial violence. 211 The
court also granted her a protective order. But the record gave no sugges-
tion of any other evidence adduced to support a reasonable basis for the
division of the community property. The trial court's judgment as to the
property division was reversed and remanded for a new division.
In a somewhat similar case with a more complete trial record, the ma-
jority of the Waco appellate court reached much the same result in Smith
v. Smith.212 In this instance, the division was disproportionate in favor of
the husband who was awarded custody of the couple's three minor chil-
dren, and the divorce court heard evidence that the wife's acts destroyed
209. Id. at 597.
210. 133 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
211. Id. at 785.
212. 143 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, no pet.).
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the marriage. The husband was awarded all of the community property
except for $6,000 awarded to the wife, and she was ordered to pay some
support for the children. The husband offered proof of the separate
property awarded to him but the wife offered no evidence of her separate
property and none was set aside to her. All of these properties were of
modest value. The equity in the family home awarded to the husband
was appraised at $47,800 with a $27,000 mortgage still owed.2 13 With re-
spect to debts, the court allocated to the wife three charge-account debts
of unspecified amount held in her name, the indebtedness on her auto-
mobile, and the rest to the husband. The husband was not in particularly
good health but earned a better salary than the wife who was able to
work at a lower wage and suffered from a back injury. The majority of
the court found that the disproportionate division of the community es-
tate was without a reasonable basis.2 14 Chief Justice Gray strongly dis-
agreed with this analysis of the divorce court's exercise of its good
judgment. "When the parties do not have much, the fact that one spouse
does not get much is not an abuse of discretion. '2 15 By the Chief Justice's
computation, the husband got ninety-one percent of the net assets but
this division resulted in his getting just short of $10,000 more than the
wife. As to the debts, eighty-eight percent were allocated to the husband
and twelve percent to the wife. "Just because the majority would have
divided the community estate differently does not establish an abuse of
discretion by the trial court. '2 16 The case was nevertheless reversed and
remanded for a redivision of the community estate.
In the divorce court's division of property in Naguib v. Naguib,217 the
wife was awarded fifty-five percent of the present value of the Canadian
pension plans of both spouses. The division of the rest of the property
was apparently equal. The wife appealed. Her complaint concerning the
division of her pension-plan-interest was based on a basic misconception
of the way that such interests are divided on divorce. Because she had
not reached retirement age and was not at the time employed in Canada,
she anticipated that she might return to Canada and be reemployed by
the same company. She imagined that a part of future possible additions
to her pension interest had already been divided in favor of her husband.
For the purpose of the division, both plans were valued at the date of
divorce and only that value was divided.2 18 In rejecting her argument, the
Dallas appellate court pointed out that "the fact that the value of the
pension plan could increase in the future is not the same as the trial
court['s] miscalculating the value of the pension plan. '2 19 The division
213. Id. at 212.
214. Id. at 214.
215. Id. at 218-19.
216. Id. at 219.
217. 137 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
218. Id. at 374-76. The court supplied the formula for the calculation. Id. at 375 n.3.
219. Id. at 376.
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had in fact been made on the basis of the valuation offered by the wife.220
Further, the wife's mere showing of dissatisfaction with the division did
not demonstrate its unfairness. 221
In some respects the problem of the future income of the husband in
Loaiza v. Loaiza222 was similar to the possible future income of the wife
in Naguib. In Loaiza, the baseball-player-husband and his wife had mar-
ried in 1998 though he had already become enamored of another woman
prior to the wedding. During the marriage, the husband's affair with the
other woman accelerated and in March of 2001 their child was born. By
that time the husband had brought suit for divorce and the couple had
separated. In early 2001, the husband had also entered into a contract
with a baseball club for compensation of $4,000,000 in 2001, $5,000,000 in
2002, and certain miscellaneous benefits including a signing bonus of
$500,000. During this time and later the husband made generous gifts (a
car for his mother and a gift of a Rolex watch to each of his teammates),
partial payment on a house for him and his wife, a car for himself, ex-
penses for care of the baby, and payment for a home for the baby's
mother. All these expenditures amounted to well over three quarters of a
million dollars. The divorce court awarded the wife almost eighty percent
of the community estate apparently including that share of the commu-
nity right of reimbursement for the husband's expenditures. In response
to the husband's complaint as to the division, oddly there was very little
discussion of the reasonableness of any of the payments for the benefit of
those other than his wife223 in light of his very large income.224 Only the
expenditures in favor of his paramour received the attention of the appel-
late court.225 The divorce court divided the wages under the contract
before they were due, sixty percent to the husband and forty percent to
the wife. This conclusion of the divorce court is apparently explained by
the trial court's assumption that past as well as future payments under
the contract belonged to the community estate. In response to the hus-
band's appeal, the appellate court also considered the husband's claim to
an award of his post-divorce earnings as the 2002 baseball season was not
completed at the time of the divorce. The court considered the terms of
his contract, and noting the provision that he was required to perform all
services before payment the court awarded him those payments of post-
divorce earning.226
Kent v. Holmes227 involved a dispute arising out of a divorce in that the
court awarded all interest in the wife's retirement benefits to her though
220. Id. at 378.
221. Id. at 379.
222. 130 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
223. The matter is alluded to only in relation to the size of the remaining community
estate.Id. 900-02.
224. See Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 55-56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd).
225. Loaiza, 130 S.W.3d at 901-02.
226. Id. at 904-09.
227. 139 S.W.3d 120 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.).
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the husband remained as designed beneficiary of optional annuity bene-
fits under the wife's Texas Teacher Retirement System's retirement
plan.22 8 Prior to the divorce the wife designated her son and his wife as
beneficiaries of a lump sum payment from her retirement account at her
death, but she was informed by the trustee of the account that her hus-
band could not be removed as a beneficiary of the optional annuity with-
out his consent or a judicial order. When the couple divorced in 1999, the
wife had already retired as a teacher. In the divorce decree both parties
were directed to execute all documents necessary to carry out the court's
decree. The trustee of the pension fund again informed the ex-wife that
the decree of divorce did not change the beneficiary-designation of the
annuity and that a new designation in writing was required. The ex-wife
failed to execute the instrument requested, but a short time before her
death she designated her son and his wife as the residuary beneficiaries
under her will, which designation she may have thought would suffice as a
beneficiary designation for the annuity. After her death, her son and his
wife received a lump sum payment to which they were entitled under the
1998 designation, but the ex-husband began to receive the annuity bene-
fits. The testamentary beneficiaries sued the ex-husband for the annuity
benefits and the attempted designates of the ex-wife appealed. The trial
court held that the beneficiary of the ex-wife's plan-account had been left
unaltered. The appellate court instructed the trial court to impose a con-
structive trust on the annuity funds in favor of the son and his wife if it
were determined that after the divorce the ex-wife had not intended that
the ex-husband would have the annuity benefits after her death.2 29 Leav-
ing such a matter to a general finding of intent under the facts of this case
amounted to treating the trial court's order that the parties should exe-
cute all documents to carry out the court's decree as having the equitable
affect of the husband's compliance with the order thus revoking the des-
ignation of the husband as taker of the annuity.
In Wilson v. Wilson,230 the husband, who had been properly served
with process, neither answered nor appeared at the trial. The wife was
the only witness and her testimony was very sparse and inconsistent. The
record was consequentially very thin as to the extent and value of the
community estate. Having failed to file a motion for a new trial, the hus-
band took a restricted appeal for review of the evidence as sufficient to
support the judgment which included a money judgment of $275,000
against the husband in favor of the wife. This award was apparently to
equalize shares in the division of the community property though it was
made without any proof of the extent of the community estate apart from
the wife's factually unsupported estimate of its value as $1,200,000. In
short the appellate court found that there was insufficient evidence to
228. For another discussion of Teacher Retirement System benefits see In re Jones, 154
S.W.3d 225 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet. h.).
229. Kent, 139 S.W.3d at 133.
230. 132 S.W.3d 533 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
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support the division of the estate.231 In reviewing the judgment, the ap-
pellate court relied principally on the provision of section 6.701 that a
petition is not taken as confessed if the respondent fails to answer.232 An
appraised inventory of the community estate should have gone some dis-
tance toward avoiding the success of this appeal.
Freeman v. Freeman2 33 illustrates the outcome of a very protracted di-
vorce of the wife from her airman husband. The suit for divorce was filed
in the latter part of 1998. The trial on division of property was held two
years later, and the final decree was not signed until late 2002. The wife
was awarded almost one-half of the husband's Air Force disposable re-
tired pay as well as all subsequent increases to it, and the wife was to be
survivor-beneficiary of the husband's military benefits on his death as the
couple had agreed. On the husband's appeal, the decree was affirmed as
to these elements. As to the divorce court's order that the husband was
prohibited from converting his military benefits to any other form of vet-
erans' benefits, the trial court's judgment was reversed as beyond the
power of the court either under Texas or federal law.234
In her appeal from the trial court's summary judgment in response to
her ex-husband's defense to her bill of review in Nelson v. Williams, 235
the ex-wife complained that the court granted her lawyer-ex-husband's
motion without allowing her relevant discovery as well as other matters
with respect to the decree based on a property settlement agreement.
The appellate court concluded that all the claims of the ex-wife concerned
the value of the community estate prior to division and that her com-
plaint could have been satisfied at the trial for divorce and were therefore
res judicata to the bill of review.236 As to her points concerning discov-
ery, the Waco appellate court ruled that they were not relevant to the
fundamental issues of the ex-wife's complaint. 237 The court was satisfied
that the evidence conclusively established that the ex-wife failed to exer-
cise due diligence in the trial for divorce. 238 Chief Justice Gray delivered
a strongly worded dissent. In his view the case fell entirely within the
holding in Rathmell v. Morrison,239 which would have been a controlling
precedent had the case not been heard on appeal under a docket equali-
zation order, and thus that controlling precedent should apply.2 40 The
Chief Justice also observed that in order for her to show that a just and
right division of community property had not been achieved, the ex-wife
231. Id. at 538.
232. Id.
233. 133 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
234. Id. at 280.
235. 135 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, no pet.).
236. Id. at 206.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 732 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ). Gray also cited two
cases from the Waco court supporting the same conclusion. Nelson, 135 S.W.3d at 207
(Gray, C.J. dissenting).
240. Nelson, 135 S.W.3d at 207.
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needed the discovery which she had requested in order to show the full
value of the community estate.
2 4 1
3. Attorney's Fees
It is well understood that an award of attorney's fees by a divorce court
is an element in the division of property. In In re Alsenz,24 2 the Houston
First District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order for di-
vorce, remanded the case for further proceedings for redivision of the
community estate and ordered release to the appellant-husband of his
cash deposit in lieu of a supersedeas bond. The wife then sought a turno-
ver order directing the husband that on receipt of the funds released to
him, he would discharge the fees of her trial and appellate lawyers. An-
other district judge (other than the trial judge) signed the order. The
husband promptly filed a writ of mandamus to the Houston First District
Court of Appeals to stay the turnover order as no final judgment support-
ing the order had been entered. The writ was conditionally granted.
243
The court held that the district judge should not have ordered that the
funds be released on condition that the husband pay the wife's attorneys'
fees and noted that the proper judge as respondent for the writ of manda-
mus was the judge who signed the order.2 44 In the course of its opinion,
the appellate court also pointed out that filing a writ of mandamus was
the proper course for the husband to follow in this instance rather than
filing an appeal. If he had complied with the order to receive the refund
of his deposit, he would have had no adequate remedy by appeal.2 45 The
court reached the further conclusion that naming the attorneys as takers
of the distribution was in itself improper because they were not named
parties to the suit. 2
46
C. CLARIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The 1987 agreed judgment for divorce that was in dispute in Cox v.
Carter2 47 provided that the wife should be paid one-half the benefits of
any retirement plan to which the husband was entitled "calculated as of
the date of the decree [of divorce]. '248 Neither party appealed. In 1992,
what the appellate court called a modification to the decree was made at
the behest of the ex-wife in order to meet the husband's federal Civil
Service Retirement Plan and thus "to meet the requirements for a 'quali-
241. Id.
242. 152 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.); see Alsenz v.
Alsenz, 115 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied), noted in Jo-
seph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 57 SMU L. REV. 991, 1006 (character
of income from a patent), 1011 (contention of fraud) (2004).
243. Alsenz, 152 S.W.3d at 622.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 621.
246. Id. at 622.
247. 145 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
248. Id. at 363.
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fied domestic relation order,' ,,249 as the court stated. But, as the appel-
late court added, "the [unquoted] modification did not change the
division of [the ex-husband's] retirement benefits" and stated that the ex-
wife's portion of the benefits "shall be paid out as specified" in the di-
vorce court's decree. 250 Ten years later, the ex-husband, who had retired
in 2002, moved to clarify prior court orders asserting that the modifica-
tion as agreed by the parties had provided for "a disproportionate share
of benefits to [the ex-wife] beyond the authority of the divorce de-
cree." 251 A clarifying order for the ex-husband was entered in 2003 and
the ex-wife appealed. The ex-wife argued that her share of the benefit
was to be calculated based on the husband's benefits at the time of retire-
ment, thus making her benefits reflect post-divorce increases in the ex-
husband's wages and therefore a larger payment for the ex-wife than that
specified in the divorce decree.252 As the Dallas appellate court pointed
out, however, this reading of the divorce decree would change what the
decree plainly said.2 53 The appellate court went on to say that the divorce
decree was not ambiguous and thus in need of clarification but that the
2003 order was "a permissible clarification nonetheless. '254 The court ad-
ded: "That the applicable [federal] regulations may have provided other-
wise at the time does not alter our duty to enforce the decree as
written.'"255
In an instance of unwarranted attempted clarification two years after
the agreed judgment of divorce was entered, the ex-wife brought a clarifi-
cation proceeding with the consequence of the rendition of a clarifying
order by the trial court. The former husband in McKnight v. Trogdon-
MCKnight256 successfully appealed that order as making substantive
changes in the unambiguous contractual terms of the divorce decree, un-
necessary alterations in the two qualified domestic relations orders, a fur-
ther change unsupported by the petitioner's pleading, and unjustified
attorney's fees.
The principal points at issue in Mladenka v. Mladenka257 were (1) an
ex-husband standing to appeal a judgment of his ex-wife rendered against
him and his brother to set aside an alleged fraudulent transfer of realty by
the ex-husband to his brother, and (2) the applicable statute of limitation
to sue in such an instance. In the divorce of the spouses the court divided
the community property and rendered a judgment against the husband in
favor of the wife for just over $100,000. The ex-husband promptly trans-




252. Id. at 364-65.
253. Id. at 366.
254. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.006(a), (b) (Vernon 1998)).
255. Id. at 366-67 (citing Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex. 2003)).
256. 132 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
257. 130 S.W.3d 397 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
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value. '2 58 Over two years (but less than four years) later, in order to levy
execution on the transferred property, the ex-wife sued the ex-husband
and his brother to set aside the conveyance. The court found that the ex-
wife had shown that the transfer was fraudulent under section
24.005(a)(1) of the Business and Commerce Code as a transfer with ac-
tual intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditor by a transfer of non-
exempt property to an insider without "reasonably equivalent value. '2 59
The husband appealed to assert that his ex-wife failed to bring her action
within the time allowed for a spouse to sue. As to his right to appeal, the
Houston Fourteenth District appellate court held that the ex-husband
had standing to appeal as a defendant named in the action and owner of
the property as a consequence of the judgment.260 With respect to the ex-
husband's argument that his ex-spouse was his "spouse" for the purpose
of the two years statute of limitation because her cause of action "ema-
nated from her status" as his spouse,2 61 the court held that she was clearly
not his spouse when she brought this action2 62 under section 24.010(a) of
the Business and Commerce Code.26 3 The four years statute of limitation
was therefore clearly applicable to the dispute.
In re Zvara264 dealt with enforcement of an unappealed divorce decree.
The ex-husband asserted that in response to his ex-wife's suit the trial
court made substantive changes in the original decree. The ex-wife had
sought enforcement of a mediated settlement agreement. The trial court
ordered the ex-husband to turn over to his ex-wife the monetary value of
forty-nine percent of a particular account on the date of the agreement.
In arriving at its enforcement order, however, the court below used the
wrong multiplier (as fifty instead of forty-nine percent of the agreed value
of the account) and thus had arrived at the incorrect product. The appel-
late court therefore modified the orders to correct the computation with-
out any need for remand and let other orders stand as supported by
sufficient evidence below. 265 There was one further troublesome point in
the lower court's order because it had a proprietary overtone with respect
to avoided or payable commissions. The divorce court's order stated that
the ex-husband would list the couple's home for sale with any broker.
He had undertaken this assignment himself. The court below changed
the language of the order to direct him to list with any broker other than
himself and the ex-husband objected to this change. The appellate court
let the change stand because there was evidence before the trial court
from which it might have been concluded that the ex-husband "was mak-
ing no effective effort to sell the property." The appellate court added
258. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a)(1) (Vernon 2002).
259. Mladenka, 130 S.W.3d at 409.
260. Id. at 401.
261. Id. at 403 n.9.
262. Id. at 403-04.
263. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.010(a) (Vernon 2002).
264. 131 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.)
265. Id. at 568-70.
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that the ex-husband's "argument disregards the fact that this clarification
proceeding was also an enforcement and contempt proceeding. '266
D. EX-SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE
In the English legal system of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
as transported to English North America the husband was required to
support his wife and she was entitled to a life estate in one-third of his
lands on his death as that might be enhanced by his testamentary provi-
sions. Though the surviving husband's benefits from the wife's property
were proportionately greater, the likelihood of her having significant
property was small. If an English couple were allowed to separate, an
ecclesiastical court would order the husband to pay for the wife's support
(alimentum or alimony). As civil divorce a vinculo became available (but
not widely practiced) in well-to-do English society, the husband was also
ordered to pay alimony as though the couple was merely still married.
Thus the English usage (originally ecclesiastical) was transplanted to En-
glish America and as divorce became more common in the twentieth cen-
tury an award of alimony tended to become a common practice in most
American jurisdictions. In nineteenth and twentieth century Texas,
where the principle of Spanish law was maintained that the surviving
spouse was entitled to one-half the subsisting profits of marriage, the
same sort of division was provided on divorce with some discretion in the
court to provide unequal shares. While other states that preserved the
Hispanic rules of survivorship in dealing with spouses tended to adopt the
alimony concept of English law, in Texas the notion of very restricted ex-
spousal maintenance on divorce was instituted in 1997 and is now codi-
fied in Chapter 8 of the Family Code. 267 To qualify for an award of future
maintenance, a spouse must show that the marriage is of at least ten
years' duration, a lack of "sufficient property, including property distrib-
uted" on divorce "to provide for . . . minimum reasonable needs," an
inability to provide self-support "through appropriate employment be-
cause of an incapacitating physical or mental disability," or a clear lack of
"earning ability in the labor market adequate to provide self-support
for ... minimum reasonable needs, as limited by section 8.054."268 The
rules of ex-spousal maintenance laid down there are not an alternative to
the division of the community estate but are to be used for "temporary
and rehabilitative support for a spouse whose ability for self-support is
lacking. "269
In making an award of ex-spousal maintenance, a divorce court must
therefore give particular attention to the ability of the petitioning spouse
to provide it personally. This fundamental rule was applied strictly in
266. Id. at 571.
267. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.001 - 8.305 (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2005).
268. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.051 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
269. See O'Carolan v. Hopper, 71 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.),




Sheshtawy v. Sheshtawy 270 where the wife's failure to introduce any evi-
dence of her diligence in seeking employment or developing skills for
employment precluded an award for ex-spousal maintenance because she
had thereby failed to overcome the presumption of section 8.053(a): 27 1
That maintenance is not warranted unless the spouse seeking mainte-
nance has exercised due diligence in:
(1) seeking suitable maintenance; or
(2) developing the necessary skills to become self-supporting during
the period of separation and during the time the suit for dissolu-
tion of marriage is pending.272
The court went on to say that "[t]his section does not apply to a spouse
who is not able to satisfy the presumption... because of an incapacitating
physical or mental disability. ' 273 This was the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals' second effort to dispose of this case. After the entry of the decree
of divorce the ex-wife instituted a proceeding for enforcement of the
maintenance provisions of the decree. The trial court had granted the ex-
wife's motions for both civil and criminal contempt for her ex-husband's
failure to comply with the judgment to pay maintenance and the ex-wife's
attorney's fees. The ex-husband's efforts to stay enforcement pending
further appeal were denied by the appeals court that also denied his writ
of habeas corpus. His application for a writ of habeas corpus to the Texas
Supreme Court followed. While that writ was pending, the intermediate
appellate court rendered its second judgment reversing and rendering the
award of spousal maintenance. Though the Texas Supreme Court then
denied a petition for review by each of the parties, that court nevertheless
granted the ex-husband's writ of habeas corpus from civil commitment.2 74
Because there was no longer any order with which he was not in compli-
ance, the Texas Supreme Court also vacated the criminal contempt order
for refusal to pay the ex-spousal maintenance and his ex-wife's attorney's
fees. 2
7 5
Yarborough v. Yarborough276 illustrates the sort of situation that war-
rants ex-spousal maintenance in compliance with the rule requiring signif-
icant efforts toward self-support under existing circumstances. In this
instance, the couple had two children, one of whom was disabled. The
trial court awarded child support to the wife as managing conservator in
an amount that may be awarded when the excess of net monthly re-
sources of the supporting parent exceeds $6,000 a month.277 The wife
demonstrated that her "minimum reasonable needs" were not met by her
270. 150 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
271. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.053(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
272. Sheshtawy, 150 S.W.3d at 777 (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.053(a) (Vernon
2005)).
273. Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.053(b) (Vernon Supp. 2005)).
274. In re Sheshtawy, 154 S.W.3d 114, 126 (Tex. 2004).
275. Id.
276. 151 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, no pet.).
277. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.126(a), (b) (Vernon 2005).
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earning power under the circumstances. The wife was recovering from an
operation and was only able to find employment every other week at
$108 a week, that is, "the best job available" under circumstances that
would allow her to give the children sufficient care. The appellate court
concluded that she met the statutory test for need of ex-spousal mainte-
nance of about $1,350 a month for one year in addition to child support
payments. 278
In Smith v. Smith,279 the divorcing couple, each of whom had children
of a prior marriage, married in 1984. At that time the husband had a
cerebral aneurism, which made his right hand unusable, and he suffered
from severe headaches. During the marriage the husband did housework
and took care of the children but did not work outside the home except in
keeping books for his lodge at $1,800 a year. He also received about
$17,000 of social security for his disability. The wife's salary as a nurse
amounted to over $75,000 a year. The couple agreed to a division of their
community property which the divorce court approved. On the basis of
this evidence, the court awarded the husband future maintenance of $300
a month until he reached the age of sixty-two when he would become
eligible to receive social security retirement payments on December 1,
2010 because of his "incapacitating physical disability," and that order
was affirmed.280
The ex-spouses before the bankruptcy court in In re Skaja281 were di-
vorced in 2002. The divorce court divided certain financial interests
equally and awarded the wife over $23,000 as part of her share of the
community property along with over $43,000 in attorney's fees. 282 The
wife was also awarded ex-spousal maintenance of $2,500 a month for
three years, the maximum amount in the absence of a showing of special
need.283 Shortly thereafter, the ex-husband filed for bankruptcy. The
bankruptcy judge granted the husband a discharge but excepted from dis-
charge the husband's obligation under the divorce decree to pay his ex-
wife's attorney's fees and ex-spousal maintenance. As to the attorney's
fees, the husband had relied on the Texas rule that a grant of attorney's
fees is an element in the division of the community estate and thus was a
matter of res judicata under the divorce decree. The bankruptcy judge
pointed out, however, that liability for attorney's fees in relation to the
terms of section 523(a)(5) has been a matter of federal definition of the
terms "alimony," "maintenance," and "support" as used in section
523(a)(5) in relation to dischargability as determined by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.284 The bankrupt ex-husband had also argued that at-
torney's fees are owed ultimately to an attorney rather than to the
278. Yarborough, 151 S.W.3d at 690-92.
279. 115 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
280. Id. at 309-10.
281. 313 B.R. 198 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2004).
282. Id. at 201.
283. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.051 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
284. See In re Dennis, 25 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1994).
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spouse. But the underlying reason for the exception of attorney's fees
from discharge is that professional assistance is necessary toward achiev-
ing the maintenance order in the divorce proceeding. Texas law controls
liability and the client-spouse will, of course, be liable for his or her con-
tractual obligations, but the other spouse may also be personally liable
under the Texas necessaries doctrine. The court, however, simply held
that the ex-wife's attorney's fees were part of the alimony owed by the
ex-husband as a matter of bankruptcy law.2 85 The attorney may enforce
the fee against his client and bankruptcy law rather than Texas law de-
fines what is not subject to discharge as a form of alimony under section
523(a)(5).2 86 The bankrupt debtor offered a further argument: that sec-
tion 523(a)(15) was intended by Congress to mean that "the assessment
of the debt obligation under (a)(5) should be controlled by what a state
court determines is alimony, maintenance, and support. '287 In response,
the district court explained that "Congress did not add (a)(15) to abro-
gate the judiciary's understanding of dischargeability under (a)(5).
2 88
The husband's bankruptcy filing occurred about three years before the
wife's 1998 filing for divorce in In re Surgent.289 The automatic stay under
the Bankruptcy Code29° was lifted by the husband's discharge about
seven months after the divorce-suit was begun. The trial court, perhaps
initially unaware of the bankruptcy case in progress, proceeded with the
divorce case, and the appellate court treated the trial court as having ju-
risdiction to consider all matters except those concerning payment from
the bankruptcy estate.2 91 The husband, who appears to have been a med-
ical doctor, was particularly noncompliant with the divorce court's orders
of spousal support. A year and a half after the beginning of the divorce
proceeding, the husband was confined for his intransigence in complying
with the court's order after the divorce became final. The appellate court
held that the first two months of the husband's confinement was a punish-
ment, that is, for criminal contempt. 292 Petitions for habeas corpus were
thrice denied before the couple entered into a mediated property settle-
ment agreement in early 2000. Over the whole time that the divorce suit
was in progress, the husband seems to have been jailed for another forty-
285. "In essence, the attorney's fees are a support to [the ex-wife] because she is re-
sponsible for payment if[the ex-husband] is permitted to discharge them." Skaja, 313 B.R.
at 203 (emphasis added).
286. Id.
287. This was the court's precis of the husband's argument. See id. at 204.
288. Then the court added: "Rather, Congress was attempting to fill a 'crack' since
many divorce obligations were being discharged under the (a)(5) analysis." The reference
to a "crack" is borrowed from the comment in In re Whittaker, 225 B.R. 131, 142 (Bankr.
E.D. La. 1998), that "Congress made the addition 'in an attempt to lessen the chance that a
divorce obligee's claim [under (a)(5)] might slip through the § 523(a)(5)'s cracks and be
discharged unjustly."' Skaja, 313 B.R. at 204 (citing Whittaker, 225 B.R. at 142 (emphasis
added)).
289. 133 S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
290. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (1998).
291. Surgent, 133 S.W.3d at 748-50.
292. Id. at 750.
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two months for civil contempt before he filed his petition for habeas
corpus. Section 21.002(b), added to the Government Code in mid 2003,
provides that confinement for civil contempt shall be limited to eighteen
months. 293 The ex-husband was therefore required to be released in late
2003, though it is not clear from the report when the divorce became
final.
E. RECOVERY OF AN ATTORNEY'S FEE AGAINST THE ATTORNEY'S
OWN CLIENT
In 1994, the client retained an attorney to represent him in a divorce
proceeding and agreed to pay legal fees as well as expenses of the suit.
After the suit was settled six months later, the attorney rendered his
statement of fees and expenses to the client, but the client failed to pay.
After the client's persistence in refusal to pay, the attorney brought suit
against his former client in 1997. This suit was filed as a motion to en-
force the decree of divorce that the attorney had defended on the part ofhis client asserting that as attorney for his client he stood as an affected
party in the suit for divorce. The attorney prevailed in the trial court and
the Beaumont Court of Appeals but his judgment was reversed by the
Texas Supreme Court in Brown v. Fullenweider294 on the ground that the
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit as appended to the divorce pro-
ceeding because he was not a party to the prior proceeding. Within sixty
days of the judgment of the Texas Supreme Court, the attorney brought
another suit against his former client to collect his fees and expenses as-
serting section 16.064(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
which provides that the passage of time to bar a suit is tolled if the prior
suit was brought in "a different court" within sixty days after dismissal forlack of jurisdiction by the court where the case was first filed.295 Apply-
ing the tolling statute liberally, 296 a majority of the Texarkana Court of
Appeals held that the statute of limitation had been tolled and therefore
the attorney's suit was timely filed : because the claimant had first filed in
a court without jurisdiction, and that was the situation to which the stat-
ute was addressed.
The dissenting judge was puzzled as to why the suit was not filed as a
separate suit in the district court that decided the suit for a divorce. 297
That judge concluded that the attorney should not be allowed to rely on
section 16.064 to toll the limitation period for his action.29s The trial
court, he asserted, "did not lack jurisdiction because [the attorney] filed
293. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 21.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 2005).294. 52 S.W.3d 169 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam), noted in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wife, 56 SMU L. REV. 1659 (2003).
295. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.064(a) (Vernon 1997).296. Brown v. Fullenweider, 135 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet.
denied).
297. Id. at 347.




in the wrong court, but because he filed it in a case in which the judgment
was already final and in a proceeding designed only to divide the marital
estate. '2 99 Further, the attorney "did not bring his suit 'mistakenly'...
but apparently for strategic reasons, in a procedurally incorrect manner.
Therefore, [the suit] is likewise beyond the scope and purpose of the toll-
ing provision at issue. '300 The dissenting judge was, perhaps, conjectur-
ing, but while doing so he might have indicated the tactical advantage
that the attorney sought to gain in trying to recover his fee.
299. Brown, 135 S.W.3d at 348.
300. Id.
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